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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether stock markets view Chinese OMAs as increasing shareholder 
wealth.   The subject is of interest given the influential role that the government plays in 
Chinese firms’ overseas activities, and the fact that the government may have objectives other 
than maximization of shareholder wealth. We examine 145 OMAs by Chinese acquiring 
firms over the year 1994-2008. We find some evidence that markets positively responded to 
news of Chinese OMAs.  However, we also find that markets responded less favorably after 
China implemented its Go Global policy encouraging overseas investment.  We hypothesize 
two reasons for this:  First, the expansion of OMAs under Go Global resulted in Chinese 
firms pursuing less attractive targets, on average.  Second, Go Global re-directed investment 
towards industries having national strategic value but diminished profit value.  Using a 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition procedure, we find no evidence to support this latter 
hypothesis.  Thus, to whatever extent strategic interests may motivate China’s Go Global 
policy, it does not appear that their pursuit has come at the expense of shareholder wealth. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper investigates whether stock markets view Chinese OMAs as increasing shareholder 
wealth.   Over the period 1994 to 2007, Chinese foreign exchange reserves increased from 
US$52 billion to over US$15 trillion (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 1996, 2008).  
Concurrently, there has been a dramatic increase in Chinese OMA activity.  By one measure, 
Chinese OMA activity rose from US$307 million in 1994 to over US$26.5 billion in 2008 
(United Nations, 2006, 2008).  Whether these investments are good for Chinese shareholders 
is a largely unanswered question.  It is of particular interest given the influential role that the 
government plays in Chinese firms’ overseas activities, and the fact that the government may 
have objectives other than maximization of shareholder wealth. 
 The study of Chinese OMAs also provides an opportunity to evaluate China’s “Go 
Global” policy.  “Go Global” is the banner name of a national policy encouraging outward 
investment by Chinese firms.  It was initially introduced in 1999, but has evolved over time 
to represent a conglomerate of individual policies.  Our study will compare stock market 
evaluations of Chinese OMAs before and after the adoption of the Go Global policy to assess 
whether the national strategic goals of this policy have come at the expense of shareholders 
of Chinese, acquiring firms. 
 There has been surprisingly little study in this area.  To the best of our knowledge, the 
only academic study that measures stock market reactions to Chinese OMA announcements 
is Chen and Young (2009).  They examine 39 deals and find a negative but statistically 
insignificant market response to OMA announcements on the (-1,0) window.  They also 
report a negative relationship between government ownership and cumulative abnormal 
returns.   
 Among the non-academic literature, Hemerling et al. (2006) studies 16 deals and find 
that “relative total shareholder returns” around the announcement day were positive in 56% 
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of deals.
1
  Luedi (2008) analyzes 56 deals over the period 1995-2007 and reports that Chinese 
acquirers “overpaid” for foreign assets in 55 percent of deals, as measured by the change in 
share prices around the announcement day.
2
  Other studies summarize various features of 
Chinese OMAs, such as location of target firms, characteristics of target industries, and 
motivations underlying foreign acquisitions (e.g. Liao, 2007; Deng, 2007, 2009; Rui and Yip, 
2008).
3
  However, these rely largely on summaries of aggregate activity and case studies of a 
few firms without any formal analyses.  Our study provides the most comprehensive analysis 
of Chinese OMAs to date, analyzing a total of 145 deals made over the years 1994-2008. 
 The study proceeds as follows:  Section II briefly discusses related literature.   Section 
III describes our data.  Section IV presents the event-study methodology we employ in our 
analysis.  Section V reports and discusses our results.  Section VI concludes.  
 
II.  RELATED LITERATURE 
 
 Three strands of literature are especially relevant to our study: (i) results from 
previous studies measuring the performance record of OMAs by acquiring firms in other 
emerging markets; (ii) the relationship between government and business in China, 
particularly with respect to overseas investments by Chinese firms; and (iii) descriptions of 
China’s “Go Global” policy.   
 Previous studies have come to conflicting conclusions about the response of share 
markets towards acquiring firms announcing OMA deals in other emerging markets.  Gubbi 
et al. (2010) evaluate 425 cross-border acquisitions by Indian firms during 2000-2007 and 
report positive and significant cumulative abnormal returns of 2.58% over the eleven-day 
window around the announcement date.  Aybar and Ficici (2009) examine 433 cross-border 
                                                 
1
 “Relative total shareholder return” is defined as “Total shareholder return” minus “Return of stock market 
index of the local market” as measured during the (-5,5) window. 
2
 Luedi (2008) defines “overpaid” as a negative share price movement in the (-2,2) window. 
3
 Chi, Sun, and Young (2010) study announcement effects of Chinese acquiring firms, but include domestic as 
well as overseas M&As. 
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M&As associated with 58 large multinational firms during the period 1991-2004.  They 
report significant, negative cumulative abnormal returns of -0.09% on the (-1,1) window.  
Kim (2003) analyzes 270 events of overseas foreign investments (which include OMAs) by 
Korean firms from 1991-1997.  He reports a lagged, positive market reaction on the day after 
announcement of 0.26%, which is significant at the 10 (but not 5) percent level.  However, 
when he restricts analysis to the 30 largest chaebol-affiliates, he finds cross-border 
investments do not increase shareholder wealth.   
 Dunning’s (1980) OLI paradigm is widely influential as a model for understanding 
the determinants of foreign direct investments.  However, Dunning and Lundan (2008) note 
that the motivations of acquiring firms from emerging markets may differ from those in 
developed markets.  In particular, government is likely to play a more prominent role in 
OMA decisions.  OMAs are frequently seen as strategic instruments to further government’s 
efforts to secure energy and other natural resources, and to appropriate new technologies.  
 With respect to China, a number of authors have noted that no discussion of Chinese 
OMAs is complete without special recognition to the role of the Chinese government (Ping, 
2007; Huaichuan and George, 2008; and Morck, Yeung, and Zhao, 2008).  The relationship 
between Chinese government and business enterprises is complicated.  Government can be 
involved directly -- via direct ownership; or indirectly -- via government ownership of shares.  
Further, different levels of government may be involved; with national, provincial, and 
municipal governments engaged individually, or operating together as joint ventures.  This 
makes the distinction between government- and private-ownership blurry at best (Antkiewicz 
and Whalley, 2007).  Liu (2005) estimates that 61.4 percent of Chinese listed companies are 
under local government control, 15.3 percent are under central government control, and 3.4 
percent are cooperatively controlled by different levels of government.  Only 12.8 percent are 
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identified as privately controlled.
4
  Similarly, Morck, Yeung, and Zhao (2008) find that 65.9 
percent of shares of firms listing on the two mainland exchanges are owned by some level of 
Chinese government or related government agencies. 
 The implications of government control are manifold.  Government can influence the 
appointment of senior company executives, can exert direct control over the kinds of business 
activities undertaken and the manner in which they are implemented, and subsidize specific 
business activities either directly or indirectly via low- or no-interest loans from the Chinese 
Central Bank.  A relatively large literature explores whether government control has 
beneficial or detrimental effects on Chinese firm performance, with evidence mixed 
depending on the particular performance metric employed (Xu and Wang, 1999; Qi, Wu, and 
Zhang, 2000; Sun, Tong, and Tong, 2002; Hovey, Li, and Naughton, 2003; Wei, Xie, and 
Zhang, 2005; Gunasekarage, Hess, and Hu, 2007).  For our purposes, the salient issue is 
whether government control causes Chinese firms to pursue OMAs for reasons other than 
increasing shareholder wealth.   
 The Chinese government’s promotion of overseas investment came into force with the 
unveiling of its “Go Out Policy” or “Going Global Strategy” -- henceforth “Go Global” – in 
1999.
5
  As a national policy, it was elevated in importance when it was adopted as part of the 
10
th
 Five Year Plan (2001-2005).
6
  The nature of this promotion has taken numerous forms, 
and continues to evolve to the present day.
7
   
 One major thrust of the Go Global policy has been the loosening of controls on 
outward investment by Chinese firms.  Outward investment requires approval by China’s 
Ministry of Commerce, with concomitant foreign currency approval from the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE).  In 2002, SAFE authorization was 
                                                 
4
 Ownership details for the remaining 7 percent were insufficient to identify the degree of government control. 
5
 See “http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Go_Global.” 
6
 See “http://www.gov.cn/node_11140/2006-03/15/content_227686.htm” (in Chinese). 
7
 The subsequent discussion of the Go Global policy relies heavily on Hagiwara (2006). 
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decentralized from the central agency to selected local authorities for projects of US$1 
million or less, with an overall investment cap of US$200 million.  Subsequent 
decentralization continued in 2005 such that foreign exchange authorization was extended to 
all provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions; the local limit was increased to US$10 
million; and the overall investment quota was expanded to US$5 billion.  In June 2006, the 
overall investment quota was abolished.    Meanwhile, authorization from the Ministry of 
Commerce was decentralized to local commercial administrations in October 2004, except 
for large state-owned enterprises. 
 A second thrust has involved direct support from the Ministry of Commerce.  Some of 
this has consisted of informational support and bureaucratic expertise in navigating foreign 
investment rules.  In July 2004, the Ministry of Commerce along with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs provided a “guidance list” of industries that should be preferred for outward 
investment.  Additional support has come in the form of preferential treatment of outward-
investing Chinese firms in terms of direct grants, tax benefits, low- or no-interest loans, 
access to foreign exchange, etc.  This culminated in November of 2004 with the creation of a 
formal loan support system under authority of the National Development and Reform 
Commission and the Export-Import Bank of China. 
 This brief summary documents some of the changes and expansions that have 
occurred in China’s Go Global policy since its inception in 1999.  The policy is associated 
with at least three main motivations.  First, it provides a means of reducing appreciation 
pressures on China’s currency, the Renminbi.  Second, it addresses concerns that there be 
sufficient resources to sustain China’s growth over the middle- to long-term.  And third, it 
presents an opportunity to modernize Chinese business via the appropriation of foreign 
technology and the assimilation of modern business practices.  To the extent that government 
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involvement in firms’ OMA decisions is prompted by these motivations, it sets up a potential 
conflict between the maximization of shareholder wealth and the pursuit of national goals.  
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III.  EXPECTED EFFECTS OF CHINA’S GO GLOBAL POLICY 
The preceding description of China’s Go Global policy allows us to hypothesize about stock 
market responses to OMA deals by Chinese firms before and after the policy.  Let the supply 
and demand of OMA projects for Chinese, acquiring firms be given by FIGURE 1.  The 
acquiring firm’s willingness to buy is represented by the height of its demand curve, and is 
the maximum amount it could pay and still earn a profit from the deal.  As not all potential 
target firms offer the same profit opportunities, the firms’ demand curve will be downward-
sloping, with more profitable targets sought-after first.  Likewise, target firms will be 
characterized by different willingnesses with respect to being acquired by the respective 
firms.  This can arise because of an overall willingness/reluctance to being acquired, or 
because competition from other potential acquirers drives up a target firm’s acquiring price.  
The result is that Chinese, acquiring firms will face an upward-sloping supply curve of OMA 
projects.  In the absence of constraints, firms would undertake Q* OMA projects. 
 The vertical distance between the demand and supply curve at a given quantity 
represents the wealth-creation potential (rents) associated with a given OMA deal.  These can 
be appropriated by the target firm, by receiving a price higher than its willingness to sell; 
and/or by the acquiring firm, by paying a price lower than its willingness to buy.
8
  Without 
loss of generality, let us assume that acquiring and target firms split these rents according to 
some fixed proportion.
9
  If the acquiring firm pays a price lower (higher) than its willingness 
to buy for a given deal, stock markets should respond to its announcement by recording 
positive (negative) abnormal profits.   
                                                 
8
 Most studies of domestic M&A performance find that shareholders from target firms acquire most if not all of 
the benefits from M&As (Andre, Kooli, and L'Her, 2004; Healy, 1992; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Loughran and 
Vijh, 1997; Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007). In contrast, studies of cross-border M&As find that these deals are 
frequently wealth-creating for shareholders of acquiring firms (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Lowinski, 
Schiereck, and Thomas, 2004; Morck and Yeung, 1992). As noted above, there are still relatively few studies of 
OMAs from less developed countries. 
9
 All the argument requires is that (i) OMA deal approvals were positively related to the expected benefit to the 
Chinese acquiring firm in the pre-Go Global period, and (ii) that the demand and supply of potentials deals was 
similar before and after Go Global.  
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 As discussed above, in the years preceding China’s Go Global policy, firms were 
heavily restricted from investing overseas.  Let us assume (for the moment) that government 
approval was given to those deals that had the greatest expected benefit to Chinese, acquiring 
firms.  Let this quantity of deals be represented in FIGURE 1 by Q (Before Go Global) < Q*.  
As long as these rents were not entirely appropriated by the target firms, we would expect 
share markets to greet their announcements with positive, abnormal returns. 
 The loosening of restrictions after Go Global allowed firms to pursue more OMA 
deals.  Ceteris paribus, these additional projects would be expected to generate smaller rents, 
reducing the profit gains from Chinese, acquiring firms and lowering share markets’ price 
responses to OMA announcements.  It is also possible that there could be pressure to pursue 
OMA deals that supported the national objectives of Go Global – such as acquiring foreign 
technology or locking in a long-term supply of natural resources – and that these could run 
counter to the private interests of shareholders.  This would be represented in FIGURE 1 by 
firms pursuing deals beyond Q*.  If this were the case, OMA deals would lower firm profits, 
and share markets would register negative, abnormal returns at their announcements. 
  A key assumption in the preceding analysis is that, during the pre-Go Global period, 
OMA approval was positively related to the expected benefit to the Chinese acquiring firm.  
No doubt other factors also played a role:  Political connectedness of company executives, 
influence of government officials associated with public ownership of the firm, and the 
ability of the deal to contribute to important political and national interests were likely also 
important.  However, as long as these were not negatively correlated with the expected sizes 
of benefits to acquiring firms, we should still expect markets to respond with smaller 
abnormal returns to OMA announcements during the Go Global period compared to the years 
before.  
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III.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
Our empirical analysis measures (i) the announcement effect of OMA deals on the 
shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms, and (ii) differences in share market responses to the 
announcement of OMA deals before and during the Go Global policy.  To do that, we 
construct a sample of Chinese firms engaged in overseas acquisitions from January 1, 1994 to 
October 10, 2008.  The data were drawn from Thomson’s SDC Platinum M&A Database.  
The selection criteria include: 
1. M&A transaction must be listed and completed between January 1, 1994 and October 
10
th
, 2008. 
 
2. The acquiring firm must be Chinese, and the target firm(s) non-Chinese. 
 
3. The acquiring firm must have its shares traded on either (i) one of the following stock 
exchanges: Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, New York, American, and Nasdaq; or 
(ii) be traded over-the-counter in the U.S. 
 
4. The firm must not be a financial firm.
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In addition, we require that there be at least 157 days of continuous data around the OMA 
announcement date (126 days for the estimation window, and 31 for the testing window); and 
that there be fewer than 50% zero return days.
11
  145 OMA events – initiated by a total of 78 
firms – satisfied these criteria.12,13   
                                                 
10
 Financial firms are subject to special accounting and regulatory requirements, making them difficult to 
compare with other firms. 
11
 A 70% criterion would produce 200 observations.  A 30% criterion produces 183 observations.  We chose the 
middle value of 50%, which gave us 194 observations. 
12
 A search of the SDC M&A database using the criterion “public bidders” identified 112 Chinese outbound 
M&A events.  Using the criteria “government” and “Hong Kong bidder” produced an additional 120 events.  
Subsequent investigation of company websites (e.g. ownership/location of headquarters, where the majority of 
the company’s business and/or employees are located) established that these were Chinese mainland firms listed 
in Hong Kong.  This initial set of 232 events was whittled down to 145 as follows:  (i) 51 events were 
eliminated because of lack of data during the estimation period.  In most of these cases, this arose because the 
listing occurred after the event.  (ii) Another 26 events were eliminated because they were listed in stock 
exchanges other than the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong or US.  (iii) Finally, 10 more events were eliminated 
because the data series contained 50% or more zero daily returns during the 157 data period (157 days = 126-
day estimation period + 31-day testing period). 
13
  Even accounting for the fact that our study includes (i) more years and (ii) listings in U.S. markets, we still 
identify many more OMA events than Chen and Young (2009).  One possible explanation for this discrepancy is 
that Chen and Young (2009, page 8) hand-collected their data through news announcements published by the 
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 TABLES 1 through 3 summarize a number of features in the data before we undertake 
a formal event-study analysis.  TABLE 1 reports year and value data for Chinese OMA deals.  
There is a positive spike in both the number and the size of deals beginning in 2002.  
Approximately three-fourths of the deals, accounting for over 90% of the total value of 
transactions, occur in the latter half of the sample period (2002-2008).  As noted above, the 
Go Global policy was initiated in 1999 and expanded in subsequent years.  The higher level 
of Chinese OMA activity occurring in 2002 and subsequent years is consistent with Go 
Global serving as a catalyst for Chinese OMA activity. 
 A potential complication in attributing the post-2001 spike in OMA deals to Go 
Global is the fact that China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2001.  However, these need not be viewed as competing determinants.  The expansion of 
trade made possible by China’s entrance into the WTO likely spurred Go Global efforts to 
promote China’s investments abroad.   
 TABLE 2 reports the geographical distribution of target firms.  Most target firms are 
located in developed countries.  Over a third of deals involve target firms located in Hong 
Kong.  Second and third place go to the U.S. and Australia.  The remainder of the deals are 
spread widely across the six continents, with Asia a common target region.  An interesting 
fact not apparent from TABLE 2 is that a significant drop-off in Hong Kong targets occurs 
with the onset of Go Global:  Hong Kong firms are roughly half as likely to be chosen as 
targets in 2002-2008 as compared to 1994-2001.
14
  
 TABLE 3 reports the distribution across industries of target firms in the 1994-2001 
and 2002-2008 time periods.  The telecommunications, electronics, and software industries 
are at or near the top in terms of targets for Chinese acquiring firms.  Other industries lag 
                                                                                                                                                        
China Mergers and Acquisitions Association (CMAA).  In contrast, we identified our OMAs through the 
Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database. 
14
 Hagiwara (2006) suggests that a substantial portion of Hong Kong OMA activity is in fact “roundtrip” 
investment that detours outside the mainland to take advantage of various tax, trade, and regulatory incentives. 
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substantially behind, with the exception of energy and nature resources, which have enjoyed 
a substantial boost during the Go Global years.  M&A activity involving target firms in the 
energy and natural resources industries comprised 30% of all deals during the Go Global 
years, compared to only 13% during 1994-2001.  This is consistent with the Go Global 
motivation of assuring sufficient resource availability to sustain China’s economic growth 
into the future.  A further discussion of changes in target firm characteristics under Go Global 
is reserved until after a formal analysis of the stock market returns associated with Chinese 
OMAs. 
 
IV.  METHODOLOGY 
We employ event-study methodology to evaluate the effect of Chinese OMAs on shareholder 
wealth.  In addition to identifying M&A deals by Chinese firms, the Thomson SDC Platinum 
M&A database also provides announcement dates.  A 31-day testing period was centered 
around the announcement day, with Day 0 being the announcement day and 15 days on either 
side, so that the testing window consisted of Days (-15,15).  The corresponding 126-day 
estimation window consisted of Days (-141,-16).    
 Daily (adjusted) stock prices (Pit) for each firm i at time t for the 157-day data period 
(-141,15) were obtained from the Thomson-Reuters Datastream database.  Daily returns (Rit) 
were computed by taking the log of stock prices (Strong 1992): 
(1) 








1ti,
it
it
P
P
lnR . 
Data during the estimation window was used to estimate the following “market model” 
specification (Brown and Warner, 1985; Strong, 1992): 
(2) itmtiiit errorRβαR  , i=1,2,…,N; t=-140,-139,…,-16; 
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where N is the total number of firms included in the sample and mtR  is the return of the local 
market index at time t.
15
  Expected returns during the testing period ( itRˆ ) were calculated by  
(3) mtiiit RβαR
ˆˆˆ  ,  i=1,2,…,N; t=-15,-14,…,14,15; 
where iαˆ  and iβˆ  are the estimated values of iα  and iβ  from Equation (2).  Abnormal returns 
for the testing period are calculated as the difference between actual returns during the testing 
period and their forecasted values (based on the coefficients estimated during the estimation 
period),  
(4) ititit RRAR
ˆ , i=1,2,…,N; t=-15,-14,…,14,15. 
 We use average abnormal return (AAR) and average cumulative abnormal return 
(ACAR) as our two measures of stock market evaluations of announcements of Chinese 
OMAs, 
(5.A) 
N
it
i 1
t
AR
AAR
N


, t=-15,-14,…,14,15;  and 
(5.B) 
2
1
1 2
TN
it
i 1 t T
T ,T
AR
ACAR
N
 


, 
where T1 and T2 are any two days within the testing window.   
 For the purpose of hypothesis testing, we standardize abnormal returns using their 
respective standard deviations, it . 
(6.A) 
N
it
iti 1
t
AR
ASAR
N



, t=-15,-14,…,14,15;  and 
(6.B) 
2
1
1 2
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it
iti 1 t T
T ,T
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N

 


, 
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 The local market indices selected for the Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong, and U.S. markets were, 
respectively, Shanghai A Shares, Shenzhen A Shares, the Hang-Seng index and the S&P 500 Composite index. 
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where ASAR and ASCAR are the average standardized abnormal return and average 
standardized cumulative abnormal return.   As it  is unknown, we follow standard practice 
(Patell, 1976; Mikkelson and Partsch, 1986; Doukas and Travlos, 1988) and estimate it  by 
(7) 
 
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2
1
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2
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



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

ˆˆ ,  
where 2iσˆ  is the estimated variance of the error term in the market model regression 
(Equation 2), L is the number of observations in the estimation period (in our case, L=125), 
Rmt (Rms) is the return on the respective market portfolio at time t (s), and mR  is the average 
return on the respective market portfolio over the estimation period.   
 If individual returns, itR , can be assumed to be distributed independently normal, then 
tASAR  and 21 T,TASCAR can be easily transformed to produce Z statistics that are distributed 
asymptotically standard normal, 
(8.A) tASAR ASARNZ t  ; and 
(8.B) 
2 1
T ,T 2 12 1
ASCAR T ,T
N
Z ASCAR
T T 1

 
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V.  RESULTS 
 
Announcement returns over all years of the sample.  The 78 Chinese firms involved in these 
145 OMA events list their shares in a variety of exchanges.  Thirty-four of these list on one of 
the two Mainland exchanges.   Thirty-six list in Hong Kong, and twenty-five list in the U.S.  
Many of these firms list on more than one exchange.  Accordingly, we conduct separate event 
studies for (i) the Mainland markets (55 observations), (ii) the Hong Kong market (85 
14 
 
observations), (iii) the U.S. markets (53 observations), and (iv) an aggregated sample that 
selects one observation per event based on highest volume of trades (145 observations). 
 TABLE 4 reports abnormal return measures for each of the three individual markets 
(Mainland, Hong Kong, and U.S.).  Panel A reports daily average abnormal returns ( tAAR ) 
for each day of the 31-day testing window.  Panel B reports average cumulative abnormal 
returns ( tACAR ) for various windows chosen to detect evidence of “leakage” (market 
responses before the official announcement) and “lagged responses.”  
 Under the null hypothesis of no announcement day effect and given a significance 
level of 5%, we would expect to see between one and two significant returns for each market 
in Panel A of the table.  This is due to the large number of days (31) in the test period.   
Accordingly, we also report significant returns at the 1 percent level.  Using this more 
stringent significance threshold, we would expect to see no significant entries in the panel if 
the announcements of OMAs have no effect on daily returns for the respective Chinese firms. 
 The mainland markets have no significant abnormal returns at the 1 percent level, but 
three at the 5 percent level (cf. Columns 1 through 3).  For the Hong Kong and U.S. markets, 
the respective number of significant returns are two at the 1 percent level and another two at 
the 5 percent level (cf. Columns 4 through 6), and one at the 1 percent level and another two 
at the 5 percent level (cf. Columns 7 through 9).  This is more than the expected number of 
significant returns that would arise under the null hypothesis.
16
   
 Looking at the Day 0 results, we see that all three markets register positive abnormal 
returns, but these are significant only in the Hong Kong market (at the 1 percent level).  If we 
expand the look to include one day on either side of Day 0, all of the abnormal returns are 
positive, except for the Day 1 returns in the Mainland market.  However, the only additional 
significant entry is for Day 1 in the U.S. markets (again at the 1 percent level).   
                                                 
16
 It is important to remember that many of the associated firms list on more than one share market, so that 
results across markets are not independent. 
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 Panel B of TABLE 4 presents results for the average cumulative abnormal returns 
(
1 2T ,T
ACAR ).  We break up the test period into seven periods.  The first three periods – (-15,-
10), (-10,-5), and (-5,-1) – are designed to pick up evidence of leakage, where traders appear 
to act on the information prior to the public announcement.  The next period, (-1,1), is 
designed to pick up the effect at the time of the announcement, recognizing that the effect 
could show up in the Day -1 and Day +1 closing prices depending on when the 
announcement was made relative to the respective markets’ closing times.  The next three 
periods – (1,5), (5,10), and (10,15) – are designed to identify evidence that markets are slow 
to respond to the release of information.  This could occur, for example, if OMA information 
was released in Chinese media, and non-Chinese-speaking traders were slow to obtain access 
to this information.  The final two rows in the table look at longer windows – (-5,5) and (-
15,15) – for evidence of sustained short-run market responses to OMA announcements. 
 Three of the ACAR entries in Panel B are significant at the 5 percent level: (5,10) for 
the Mainland markets, and (-1,1) for both the Hong Kong and U.S. markets, with the Hong 
Kong result significant at the 1 percent level.  For the (-1,1) window, abnormal cumulative 
returns are positive for all three markets.  For the wider windows (-5,5) and (-15,15), all 
entries are positive except for the Mainland markets over (-15,15), but none are significant. 
 TABLE 5 aggregates the observations from the previous markets.  However, to avoid 
double-counting of the same event, it selects only one observation per event.  When firms list 
on more than one market, we select the observation from the market with the highest volume.  
The aggregated sample has 145 observations.  As before, Panel A reports the tAAR  results, 
while Panel B reports the 
1 2T ,T
ACAR  results for the respective windows. 
 When the results are aggregated, only one of the thirty-one tAAR  results is significant 
at the 1 percent level, and that is the Day 0 announcement day results.  The associated p-
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value is 0.0010.  In Panel B, the 
1 2T ,T
ACAR  results show significant results for the (-1,1) 
window at the 1 percent level.  None of the other results are significant below the 10 percent 
level.  The short-term announcement effect on (-1,1) does not appear to be sustained over the 
longer windows of (-5,5) and (-15,15) for the aggregated observations. 
 We conclude the following from the preceding analysis of stock exchange responses 
to OMA announcements.  We find evidence of a positive stock market response over the (-
1,1) window.  This result is statistically significant at at least the 5 percent level for the 
aggregated sample of 145 deals, and for the individual Hong Kong and U.S. market samples 
(but not for the Mainland markets).  For the aggregated sample, the average cumulative 
abnormal return is approximately 1.6 percent for this window.  However, we find no 
evidence of significant cumulative abnormal returns over the (-5,5) and (-15,15) windows.   
 Announcement returns before and after the implementation of Go Global.  The 
preceding results combined all OMA deals from 1994 to 2008.  As discussed above, while 
the Go Global policy was unveiled in 1999, it has expanded from relatively modest 
beginnings over time.  This makes it difficult to draw a hard and fast line to demarcate 
“before” and “after” the implementation of Go Global.  For the purposes of the subsequent 
analysis, and guided by TABLE 1, we delineate the two periods by 1994-2001 and 2002-
2008, respectively.
17
   
 TABLE 6 explores differences in abnormal returns across the two time periods, and 
for each of our four samples.  All of the entries represent ACAR values over the (-1,1) 
window.  For three of the four samples, the respective cumulative abnormal returns are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  For the Mainland, they are 
negative, but insignificant.  The next row reports cumulative abnormal returns for each of the 
                                                 
17
 Luo, Xue, and Han (2010) demarcate the “Go Global” (or “Going Abroad”) period as 2001 to the present. 
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four samples over the 2002-2008 period.  While all of associated returns are positive, none 
are significantly different from zero. 
 The lower panel of TABLE 6 tests for differences in ACAR values across the two time 
periods.  For the Hong Kong, US, and Aggregated markets, the differences are negative and 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  These are consistent with the hypothesis above 
that the relaxation of OMA restrictions under Go Global would result in additional projects 
with smaller rents.  This would reduce profit gains for Chinese, acquiring firms and cause 
share markets’ price responses to OMA announcements to be lower during the Go Global 
period.   
 Averages can sometimes mask important features of the data.  As a result, FIGURE 2 
graphs individual cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for the (-1,1) window for the 
Aggregated data set (i.e., the observations that underlie the results from Column (4) in 
TABLE 6).  These corroborate the findings from TABLE 6 with one additional insight: The 
lower returns during the Go Global period are mostly due to smaller returns on the positive 
end of the abnormal return distribution.  Even so, substantial differences exist in the 
distributions of abnormal returns across the individual market samples (cf. Appendix).  
 Investigation of reasons for lowered announcement returns during the Go Global 
period.  The preceding results are consistent with the hypothesis that the expansion of OMAs 
under Go Global was associated with lower profit expectations for Chinese, acquiring firms.  
Two possible reasons are given above for why this might be so.  First, as Go Global relaxed 
restrictions on OMAs, Chinese, acquiring firms increased the number of deals they 
undertook.  Indeed, deals increased almost three-fold over the eight-year period preceding Go 
Global.  These additional deals represented smaller profit opportunities.  Second, Go Global 
directed investment towards industries having critical strategic value, such as natural resource 
18 
 
and/or high technology industries.  This led firms to undertake deals that progressed national 
interests at the expense of shareholder wealth.  
 To investigate which of these reasons is responsible for the observed differences in 
pre- and post-Go Global announcement returns, we examine five characteristics of deals.  
These are described in TABLE 7. GOVTOWNED is a dummy variable that identifies whether 
the acquiring firm is a government-owned enterprise.  ENERGY and TECHNOLOGY are 
variables that indicate whether the target firm is located in the natural resources/energy or 
high technology industries.  TARGET_HK is a dummy variable that indicates whether the 
target firm is located in Hong Kong.  The variable RELATED indicates whether the target 
firm is located in the same industry as the acquiring firm (as measured by 2-digit SIC code).   
 The first three variables are designed to capture the influence of Go Global on firms’ 
OMA decisions.  Firms that are government owned should be more willing to trade off the 
interests of other shareholders in favour of national strategic interests.  Further, since two of 
the three motivations underlying Go Global are to secure natural resources and appropriate 
new technologies, we would expect to see the lower abnormal returns in the Go Global period 
related to deals with target firms in these industries.  The last two variables are control 
variables.  
 The top panel of TABLE 8 contrasts sample means of the respective deal 
characteristics before and after Go Global.  There are several consistent patterns in the types 
of OMA deals undertaken after Go Global (though the Mainland sometimes provides an 
exception).  Approximately half as many deals in the Go Global period involved Hong Kong 
targets compared to before.  Further, as indicated already in TABLE 3, there was a significant 
increase in the number of deals that involved target firms in the natural resource and energy 
fields.  There was also a significant increase in the frequency with which target firms were 
located in the same industry as the acquiring firm. 
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 Differences in the respective contributions of those characteristics can also help 
explain differences in announcement returns.  To explore this further, we estimated the 
following relationship between individual cumulative abnormal returns and the different deal 
characteristics,  
(9) 
1 2 3
4 5
i 0 i i i
i i i
CAR(-1,1) β β GOVTOWNED β ENERGY β TECHNOLOGY
                     β TARGET_HK β RELATED error  
    
 
, 
for each of the two time periods and each of the four samples.  The respective coefficients are 
reported in Panel B of TABLE 8. 
 Only one of the five deal characteristics is significantly related to cumulative 
abnormal returns in the eight different regressions: the coefficient for RELATED is negative 
and significant in the regression based on the pre-Go Global/Hong Kong sample.  There are 
nineteen “pairs” of coefficients, comparing before and after Go Global.18  Seven of them take 
different signs.  Notably, the constant term is substantially smaller in the Go Global period. 
 TABLE 8 identifies that substantial differences exist between both (i) deal 
characteristics, and (ii) their relative contributions to abnormal returns (as measured by the 
estimated coefficients in Equation 9).  In order to better understand their relative impacts, we 
employ the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaco, 1973).  This 
procedure is commonly employed in the labor economics literature to analyze wage 
differences between two different groups (e.g., male and female workers).  It decomposes the 
mean difference in wages into the portion that can be explained by (i) differences in the 
characteristics of the two groups, and (ii) differences in the estimated coefficients in an 
Equation (9)-type regression. 
 Let 1Y  and 2Y  represent the sample means of the dependent variable for two groups.  
It follows that 11βX
ˆ1Y  and 222Y βX
ˆ ; where 1βˆ  and 2βˆ  are the estimated coefficients 
                                                 
18
 Note that there is no coefficient for ENERGY in the pre-Go Global/U.S. sample because there were no energy 
deals for that sample. 
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from regressing Y on X for the two groups, and 
1X  and 2X  are the vector of sample means 
of the respective explanatory variables.  Two common methods for decomposing 12 YY   are 
(10a)    12212112 YY ββXXXβ ˆˆˆ   , and 
 
(10b)    12112212 YY ββXXXβ ˆˆˆ  . 
 
Method A weights the difference in characteristic sample means  12 XX   by 1βˆ , and the 
difference in estimated coefficients,  12 ββ ˆˆ   by 2X .  Method B uses the weights 2βˆ  and 
1X , respectively.   
 If Go Global directed investment towards targets that benefitted national strategic 
interests at the expense of firm value, this should be reflected in either the effect of the 
differences in sample means,  12 XX  , or the differences in estimated coefficients, 
 12 ββ ˆˆ  , or both.  For example, suppose energy firms generally made less attractive targets 
for Chinese acquirers than firms in other industries.  Then an increase in the number of 
ENERGY deals would be associated, ceteris paribus, with lower abnormal announcement 
returns.  In other words, the effect of Go Global would be reflected in the  12 XX   
component.   
 Alternatively, suppose that prior to Go Global, Chinese firms only acquired energy 
firms that were likely to increase shareholder wealth.  But after Go Global, government 
policy-makers encouraged them to acquire energy firms even if it was likely to lower profits.  
In this case, the effect of Go Global would show up in a lower estimated coefficient on the 
ENERGY variable; and the effect of Go Global would be reflected in the  12 ββ ˆˆ   
component. 
 TABLE 9 reports the results of applying the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to the 
difference in ACAR values in the pre- and post-Go Global periods for each of the four 
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samples.  Changes in (i) mean sample characteristics,  12 XX  , and (ii) estimated 
coefficients,  12 ββ ˆˆ  , are identified by “Means” and “Coefficients” respectively.  The 
numbers in the table represent the percentage difference “explained” by the respective change 
for each variable, including changes in the estimated value of the constant term.
19
  A positive 
number suggests that the change contributed to the difference in ACAR values.  A negative 
number suggests the opposite; namely, that the observed gap is smaller as a result of the 
respective change.  We are looking for variables with large positive values for either 
“Means,” “Coefficients,” or both. 
 For example, average cumulative abnormal returns on the (-1,1) window were 
approximately 4.8 percent lower for the Hong Kong market during the Go Global years (cf. 
ACAR2002-2008 - ACAR1994-2001 = -0.0483 in TABLE 6).  At the same time, a higher percent of 
deals involved targets in the ENERGY industries.  Thirty-eight percent of OMA deals by 
Hong Kong-listed, Chinese acquiring firms targeted ENERGY firms after Go Global, 
compared to only fifteen percent before (cf. TABLE 8).   Methods A and B of the Blinder-
Oaxaco decomposition procedure calculate that the combination of the change in means and 
the change in coefficients contributed approximately 38.6 percent (= 92.9 – 54.3 using 
Method A; = 36.2 + 2.4 using Method B) of the ACAR difference in the two time periods.
20
  
This suggests that the greater targeting of energy firms under Go Global contributed to the 
lower abnormal returns associated with the announcement of OMA deals during this period. 
 Unfortunately, this finding is not robust across the different samples.  For example, 
the Blinder-Oaxaca approach calculates that ENERGY-associated changes accounted for only 
5.8 percent of the lower abnormal returns for U.S.-listed shares in the Go Global period.  
Further, based on the Aggregated sample, the same approach leads to the conclusion that the 
                                                 
19
 Note that the “Sum” of the “Mean” and “Coefficients” contributions over all variables (including the constant 
term) must equal 100 percent. 
20
 While Methods A and B assign different contributions to the differences in means and the differences in 
coefficients, the sum of these contributions will always be the same (cf. Equations 10a and 10b). 
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gap would have been 24.6 percent larger without the associated ENERGY changes (= -68.9 + 
44.3 using Method A; = -29.2 + 4.7 using Method B).   
 TABLE 9 finds no support for the hypothesis that the lower abnormal returns during 
the Go Global period are due to changes associated with one or more of the GOVTOWNED, 
ENERGY, and TECHNOLOGY variables.  Indeed, the sum of the associated contributions in 
the Aggregated sample suggests that the difference in ACAR values would have been even 
larger were it not for changes in these variables.   
 TABLE 9 is noteworthy for two additional things; one for what it doesn’t show, and 
one for what it does.  First, there is no firm characteristic that is consistently identified with 
the decline in announcement returns during the Go Global period.  Instead, the decline is 
“explained” by the constant term. This is consistent with the fact that it is the overall increase 
in the number of deals -- and not government-influenced investment pursuing public interests 
at the expense of private shareholders -- that is responsible for lower announcement returns 
during the Go Global period. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Our study is motivated by two questions:  
1. What has been the effect on shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms? 
2. Has the Chinese government’s “Go Global” policy disadvantaged shareholders in 
Chinese acquiring firms in order to pursue larger, national interests? 
 
We answer these questions using an event-study methodology to investigate announcement 
effects of overseas mergers and acquisitions (OMAs) by Chinese, acquiring firms over the 
1994-2008 period.   
 The first question is of interest because of the heavy involvement of the public sector 
in the ownership of Chinese firms (Antkiewicz and Whalley, 2007; Liu, 2005; Morck, 
Yeung, and Zhao, 2008).  This raises concerns that OMA decisions by Chinese firms may not 
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be concentrated on maximizing shareholder wealth.  Our analysis finds no support for these 
concerns.  We find some evidence that markets positively evaluated announcements of 
OMAs by Chinese acquiring firms, and no evidence that these announcements were 
negatively evaluated.   
 With respect to the second question, our theoretical analysis identifies two possible 
effects of the Go Global policy.  First, as Go Global relaxed restrictions on OMAs, it allowed 
Chinese, acquiring firms to pursue additional profit-improving deals.  Second, it may also 
have re-directed investment towards industries having critical strategic value, such as 
resource and technology industries. While the first effect should be wealth-increasing for 
shareholders, these additional deals could lower the average benefit of a deal to Chinese 
acquirers if only the most profitable deals were approved during the pre-Go Global period.  
The second effect should be wealth-decreasing if Chinese firms were led to sacrifice 
shareholder interests in behalf of progressing national strategic goals.  Thus, while both 
effects would be reflected in lower abnormal returns during the Go Global period, only the 
second effect disadvantages shareholders of Chinese acquiring firms.   
 Our empirical analysis confirms that there were more deals during the Go Global 
period, and that the average benefit of these deals, as measured by market responses to 
announcements of OMA deals, was lower during the Go Global period.  However, we find no 
evidence of negative abnormal returns under Go Global.   
 To further investigate the second effect, we use a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition 
procedure (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) to determine whether the lower abnormal returns 
associated with the Go Global period are due to variables associated with Go Global policy.  
We find no evidence that the lower returns were associated with firms being government-
owned, or with deals being energy or technology-related.   
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 In conclusion, under Go Global there have been more deals with generally lower 
expected benefits to shareholders.  However, there is no evidence that Go Global has caused 
Chinese acquiring firms to sacrifice shareholder wealth in order to pursue national interests.  
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TABLE 1 
Distribution of Chinese OMA Deals by Year 
 
A.  Total Deals 
 
Year 
Number of 
Deals 
Deal Value 
Available 
Total Value of 
Deals ($mil) 
Average Value of 
Deals ($mil) 
1994 1 1 98.49 98.49 
1995 1 1 1.34 1.34 
1996 3 2 482.06 241.03 
1997 6 5 706.80 141.36 
1998 8 7 503.16 71.88 
1999 5 3 45.86 15.29 
2000 7 5 75.88 15.18 
2001 8 5 68.68 13.74 
2002 15 14 2221.67 158.69 
2003 12 10 2342.86 234.29 
2004 17 9 2267.86 251.98 
2005 8 6 4243.59 707.26 
2006 15 10 8812.72 881.27 
2007 24 14 1907.58 136.26 
2008 15 7 824.82 117.83 
Total 145 99 24603.4 248.52 
 
 
Table 1 shows time and deal value distribution of 145 Chinese Outbound M&A transactions 
(OMAs) initiated by 98 Chinese acquirers from 1/1/1994 to 30/10/2008. Events and deal 
value clustered in the period 2002-2008. Chinese OMAs decline sharply after the Global 
Financial Crisis. The number of transactions peaked in 2002 and 2007, while the highest 
average transaction value happened in year 2006. 
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TABLE 2 
Distribution of Chinese OMA Deals by Region and Country 
 
Country 
Number of  
Deals 
Deal Value  
Available 
Total Value of 
Deals ($mil) 
Average Value of  
Deals ($mil) 
 
Developed nations 
     Hong Kong
21 
55 41 4791 117 
     United States 16 13 2590 199 
     Australia 8 7 847 121 
     Canada 4 2 772 386 
     Germany 4 1 8 8 
     France 3 3 232 77 
     Japan 3 1 300 300 
     Netherlands 2 1 148 148 
     United Kingdom
22 
2 1 4141 4141 
     Norway 1 1 104 104 
     Sum 98 71 13934 196 
 
Asia 
     Singapore 6 2 981 490 
     Indonesia 5 4 1129 282 
     Kazakhstan 3 2 525 262 
     India 2 1 1 1 
     Thailand 2 1 18 18 
     Azerbaijan 2 2 70 35 
     Pakistan 2 1 284 284 
     South Korea 2 2 472 236 
     Russian Fed 2 2 3600 1800 
     Malaysia 1 1 11 11 
     Philippines 1 1 70 70 
     Sum 28 19 7162 377 
 
 
                                                 
21
 We include Hong Kong targets in the overseas M&A group because most researchers argue that Hong Kong 
has obviously different economic system away from Chinese mainland. 
22
 Both of the target firms are PetroKazakhstan and with the nationality of United Kingdom in SDC database 
because they argue that the headquarter of PetroKazakhstan is in the United Kingdom. However, most Chinese 
consider it as a Canadian firm. In Zephyr M&A database, the nationality of PetroKazakhstan is Canada too. 
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Country 
Number of  
Deals 
Deal Value  
Available 
Total Value of 
Deals ($mil) 
Average Value of  
Deals ($mil) 
 
 
Africa 
     Nigeria 2 1 2692 2692 
     Chad 1 1 202 202 
     South Africa 1 1 21 21 
     Sum 4 3 2916 972 
 
South America 
     British Virgin 3 2 33 17 
     Peru 2 1 200 200 
     Venezuela 1 1 241 241 
     Brazil 1 1 18 18 
     Ecuador 1 1 100 100 
     Sum 8 6 592 99 
     
Others 7 0 n.a. n.a. 
     
Total 145 99 24603 249 
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TABLE 3 
Distribution of Chinese OMA Deals by Target Industries (1994-2001 versus 2002-2008) 
 
1994-2001 2002-2008 
Target Industry Sector 
Percent 
of Deals 
Average Value 
of Deals ($mil) 
Target Industry Sector 
Percent 
of Deals 
Average Value 
of Deals ($mil) 
Telecommunication and 
Electronics, Prepackaged Software
a 31% 16 
Telecommunication and 
Electronics, Prepackaged Software
 29% 223 
Energy and Natural Resources
b 
13% 195 Energy and Natural Resources
 
30% 591 
Wholesale, Retail, Trade
c 
13% 69 Wholesale, Retail, Trade
 
6% 53 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 
Products
d 13% 10 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 
Products
 10% 78 
Electric, Gas, and Water 
Distribution, Construction 
10% 13 
Electric, Gas, and Water 
Distribution, Construction 
5% 215 
Transportation
e 
8% 279 Transportation
 
6% 228 
Miscellaneous Business Services
f 
8% 6 Miscellaneous Business Services
 
11% 182 
Chemicals and Drugs
g 5% 1 Chemicals and Drugs
 
3% 58 
 
a
 “Telecommunication and Electronics, Prepackaged Software Industry” consists of the following SDC categories: “Computer and Office 
Equipment;” “Telecommunications;”  “Electronic and Electrical Equipment;” “Communications Equipment;” and “Prepackaged Software.”  
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b
 “Energy and Natural Resources” consists of the following SDC categories: “Oil and Gas;” “Petroleum Refining;” “Mining;” “Metal and Metal 
Products;” and “Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing.”  
 
c
 “Wholesale, Retail, Trade” consists of the following SDC categories: “Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods;” “Wholesale Trade-Durable 
Goods;” and “Miscellaneous Retail Trade.”  
 
d
 “Miscellaneous Manufacturing Products” consists of the following SDC categories: “Measuring, Medical, Photo Eqipment;” “Clocks;” “Food 
and Kindred Products;” “Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products;” “Textile and Apparel Products;” “Wood Products, Furniture, and 
Fixtures;” “Machinery;” “Miscellaneous Manufacturing;” and “Transportation Equipment.”  
 
e
 “Transportation” consists of the following SDC categories: “Transportation and Shipping (except Air);” and “Air Transportation and 
Shipping.” 
 
f
 “Miscellaneous Business Services”  consists of the following SDC categories: “Business Services;” “Health Services;” “Investment and 
Commodity Firms, Dealers, Exchanges;” and “Radio and Television Broadcasting Stations.”  
 
g
 “Chemicals and Drugs” consists of the following SDC categories: “Drugs;” and “Chemicals and Allied Products.” 
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TABLE 4A 
Daily Responses: By Individual Exchanges 
 
Day 
Mainland HK US 
AAR 
(1) 
Z 
(2) 
p-value 
(3) 
AAR 
(4) 
Z 
(5) 
p-value 
(6) 
AAR 
(7) 
Z 
(8) 
p-value 
(9) 
-15 -0.0033 -0.7676 0.4427 -0.0078* -2.5027 0.0123 0.0006 0.1407 0.8881 
-14 -0.0016 -1.0227 0.3064 -0.0053 -1.2785 0.2011 -0.0145* -2.3834 0.0172 
-13 0.0028 0.8482 0.3963 -0.0004 -0.5646 0.5724 0.0136 1.8288 0.0674 
-12 0.0057* 2.0771 0.0378 0.0027 1.1370 0.2555 0.0149 1.4820 0.1383 
-11 -0.0053 -1.8470 0.0647 -0.0039 -1.4377 0.1505 0.0022 0.0131 0.9896 
-10 0.0009 -0.0279 0.9777 -0.0006 0.4789 0.6320 0.0057 0.7438 0.4570 
-9 0.0005 -0.1135 0.9096 0.0046 1.2314 0.2182 -0.0014 -0.2871 0.7741 
-8 -0.0004 -0.3891 0.6972 -0.0007 -0.3645 0.7155 -0.0012 -0.0013 0.9990 
-7 -0.0009 -0.0272 0.9783 -0.0056* -1.9829 0.0474 -0.0100 -1.6606 0.0968 
-6 0.0002 0.2940 0.7688 0.0029 0.8913 0.3728 0.0062 1.0362 0.3001 
-5 0.0006 0.0770 0.9386 0.0030 0.6264 0.5310 0.0100 1.7559 0.0791 
-4 0.0036 1.6558 0.0978 -0.0007 -0.4280 0.6687 -0.0040 -0.3298 0.7416 
-3 0.0048* 2.2021 0.0277 -0.0035 -0.4375 0.6618 -0.0016 -0.5492 0.5828 
-2 -0.0002 -0.2589 0.7957 0.0021 0.8802 0.3787 -0.0098 -1.1695 0.2422 
-1 0.0012 0.2031 0.8390 0.0029 1.0672 0.2859 0.0043 0.7780 0.4366 
0 0.0041 1.7442 0.0811 0.0105** 2.5998 0.0093 0.0124 0.8727 0.3828 
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Day 
Mainland HK US 
AAR 
(1) 
Z 
(2) 
p-value 
(3) 
AAR 
(4) 
Z 
(5) 
p-value 
(6) 
AAR 
(7) 
Z 
(8) 
p-value 
(9) 
1 -0.0027 -1.5190 0.1288 0.0018 1.0377 0.2994 0.0114** 2.6739 0.0075 
2 -0.0063 -1.5413 0.1233 0.0019 1.1161 0.2644 -0.0138* -2.0683 0.0386 
3 -0.0029 -0.8133 0.4161 -0.0060 -1.5086 0.1314 -0.0032 -0.8033 0.4218 
4 -0.0015 -0.0079 0.9937 -0.0007 0.0272 0.9783 0.0001 0.0158 0.9874 
5 0.0009 0.2636 0.7921 0.0015 0.6843 0.4938 -0.0028 -0.2238 0.8229 
6 -0.0015 0.4509 0.6520 -0.0014 -0.3037 0.7613 0.0012 0.3985 0.6902 
7 0.0056 1.8594 0.0630 0.0023 0.6814 0.4956 0.0076 0.2748 0.7834 
8 0.0009 0.7210 0.4709 -0.0014 -0.7913 0.4288 -0.0023 0.1287 0.8976 
9 0.0001 0.5021 0.6156 -0.0006 0.2778 0.7812 -0.0026 -0.8353 0.4035 
10 0.0034 1.4840 0.1378 -0.0030 -0.3411 0.7330 -0.0004 -0.2114 0.8326 
11 -0.0022 -1.0813 0.2796 -0.0012 -0.1396 0.8890 -0.0027 0.1550 0.8768 
12 -0.0037 -1.8380 0.0661 -0.0024 -0.3025 0.7623 -0.0029 -0.9062 0.3648 
13 0.0005 0.3253 0.7450 -0.0002 0.1944 0.8458 0.0015 0.2961 0.7672 
14 0.0001 1.0555 0.2912 -0.0028 -1.2140 0.2247 0.0076 1.1823 0.2371 
15 -0.0060* -2.5253 0.0116 0.0135** 3.3297 0.0009 -0.0082 -1.5199 0.1285 
N 55 85 53 
  
* Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test). 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test). 
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TABLE 4B 
Cumulative Responses: By Individual Exchanges 
 
 
Day 
Mainland HK US 
ACAR 
(1) 
Z 
(2) 
p-value 
(3) 
ACAR 
(4) 
Z 
(5) 
p-value 
(6) 
ACAR 
(7) 
Z 
(8) 
p-value 
(9) 
(-15,-10) -0.0009 -0.3021 0.7626 -0.0152 -1.7014 0.0889 0.0225 0.7451 0.4562 
(-10,-5) 0.0011 -0.0762 0.9392 0.0036 0.3595 0.7192 0.0093 0.6479 0.5170 
(-5,-1) 0.0100 1.7348 0.0828 0.0037 0.7640 0.4449 -0.0010 0.2170 0.8282 
(-1,1) 0.0026 0.2472 0.8047 0.0151** 2.7162 0.0066 0.0280* 2.4967 0.0125 
(1,5) -0.0125 -1.6180 0.1057 -0.0014 0.6067 0.5440 -0.0084 -0.1814 0.8560 
(5,10) 0.0093* 2.1560 0.0311 -0.0027 0.0846 0.9325 0.0007 -0.1912 0.8484 
(10,15) -0.0079 -1.0532 0.2923 0.0038 0.6234 0.5330 -0.0050 -0.4099 0.6818 
(-5,5) 0.0016 0.6047 0.5454 0.0128 1.7080 0.0876 0.0030 0.2871 0.7740 
(-15,15) -0.0026 0.3562 0.7217 0.0014 0.4784 0.6324 0.0179 0.1486 0.8819 
 
 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test). 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test). 
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TABLE 5A 
Daily Responses: Aggregated Exchanges 
 
Day AAR Z p-value 
-15 -0.0043 -1.5921 0.1114 
-14 -0.0051 -1.0597 0.2893 
-13 0.0048 0.8378 0.4021 
-12 0.0082* 2.5346 0.0113 
-11 -0.0032* -2.0300 0.0424 
-10 0.0029 1.0520 0.2928 
-9 0.0024 0.6223 0.5338 
-8 -0.0009 -0.3905 0.6962 
-7 -0.0068* -2.1173 0.0342 
-6 0.0034 1.1888 0.2345 
-5 0.0044 1.2565 0.2089 
-4 0.0004 0.6813 0.4957 
-3 -0.0006 0.6487 0.5165 
-2 -0.0044 -1.1983 0.2308 
-1 0.0025 0.9388 0.3479 
0 0.0120** 3.2905 0.0010 
1 0.0010 0.3552 0.7224 
2 -0.0076* -2.4207 0.0155 
3 -0.0056* -1.9768 0.0481 
4 0.0003 0.4100 0.6818 
5 -0.0005 0.1974 0.8435 
6 -0.0042 -1.5033 0.1328 
7 0.0046 1.2982 0.1942 
8 -0.0010 0.0958 0.9237 
9 -0.0014 -0.6192 0.5358 
10 0.0005 0.6282 0.5299 
11 -0.0031 -0.7623 0.4459 
12 -0.0023 -0.9831 0.3256 
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Day AAR Z p-value 
13 0.0006 0.6750 0.4997 
14 -0.0001 -0.3044 0.7609 
15 -0.0014 -0.3718 0.7100 
N = 145 
 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level (two-tailed 
test). 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level (two-tailed 
test). 
 
39 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5B 
Cumulative Responses: Aggregated Exchanges 
 
Days ACAR Z p-value 
(-15,-11) 0.0033 -0.1051 0.9163 
(-10,-6) 0.0055 0.6580 0.5105 
(-5,-1) 0.0024 1.0406 0.2980 
(-1,1) 0.0156** 2.6469 0.0081 
(1,5) -0.0123 -1.5362 0.1245 
(5,10) -0.0020 0.0396 0.9684 
(10,15) -0.0058 -0.4566 0.6480 
(-5,5) 0.0021 0.6580 0.5105 
(-15,15) -0.0043 -0.1111 0.9116 
 
 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level (two-tailed 
test). 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level (two-tailed 
test). 
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TABLE 6 
Cumulative Responses: 1994-2001 versus 2002-2008 
 
 
Time Period 
Mainland 
(1) 
Hong Kong 
(2) 
US 
(3) 
Aggregated 
(4) 
1994-2001 
-0.0079 
(Z = -0.79, N = 9) 
0.0531 
(Z = 3.71, N = 20) 
0.0836 
(Z = 2.97, N = 12) 
0.0459 
( Z = 3.46, N = 39) 
2002-2008 
0.0051 
(Z = 0.75, N = 46) 
0.0048 
(Z = 1.31, N = 65) 
0.0114 
(Z = 1.26, N = 42) 
0.0054 
(Z = 0.79, N = 106) 
ACAR2002-2008 - ACAR1994-2001 0.0130 -0.0483 -0.0722 -0.0405 
H0: ACAR2002-20081 = ACAR1994-2001 Z = 1.02 Z = -2.61 Z = -2.02 Z = -2.31 
 
* Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level (two-tailed test). 
** Indicates statistical significance at the 1 percent level (two-tailed test). 
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TABLE 7 
Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
GOVTOWNED 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if firm is a government-owned enterprise (as 
determined by SDC Platinum database) 
0.5034 0.5017 
ENERGY 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the target  firm is in the “Energy and 
Natural Resources” industry 
0.2552 0.4375 
TECHNOLOGY 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the target  firm is in the 
“Telecommunication and Electronics, Prepackaged Software,” “Transportation,” or 
“Chemicals and Drugs” industries 
0.4000 0.4916 
TARGET_HK 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the target firm is headquartered in Hong 
Kong 
0.3793 0.4869 
RELATED 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the acquiring and target firms are both in 
the same 2-digit, SIC industry 
0.5241 0.5011 
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TABLE 8 
Comparison of Sample Means and Estimated Coefficients: 1994-2001 Versus 2002-2008 
 
Variables 
Mainland Hong Kong US Aggregated 
1994-2001 2002-2008 1994-2001 2002-2008 1994-2001 2002-2008 1994-2001 2002-2008 
A) Sample Means 
     GOVTOWNED 0.5555 0.3696 0.8500 0.6462 0.0833 0.5238 0.5641 0.4811 
     ENERGY 0.2222 0.2609 0.1500 0.3846 0.0000 0.3095 0.1282 0.3019 
     TECHNOLOGY 0.2222 0.3043 0.4500 0.3846 0.7500 0.4048 0.4615 0.3774 
     TARGET_HK 0.4444 0.2174 0.6000 0.3385 0.6667 0.2381 0.6154 0.2925 
     RELATED 0.5555 0.5000 0.3000 0.6769 0.0833 0.6905 0.2821 0.6132 
B) Estimated Coefficients 
     GOVTOWNED -0.0262 -0.0004 -0.0889 -0.0082 -0.0295 -0.0112 -0.0323 0.0029 
     ENERGY -0.0569 -0.0005 0.1117 -0.0049 n.a. -0.0135 -0.1034 -0.0110 
     TECHNOLOGY -0.0262 -0.0178 0.0487 0.0091 -0.2544 0.0119 -0.0460 0.0024 
     TARGET_HK -0.0171 -0.0182 -0.0538 -0.0091 -0.1759 -0.0187 -0.0909 -0.0205 
     RELATED -0.0042 -0.0007 -0.1549* 0.0199 -0.1223 0.0208 -0.0507 0.0018 
     Constant 0.0350 0.0152 0.1687 -0.0018 0.4043 0.0067 0.1689 0.0113 
Observations 9 46 20 65 12 42 39 106 
 
* Indicates significant difference at the 5% level. 
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TABLE 9 
Decomposition of the 1994-2001 / 2002-2008 ACAR Gap 
 
 GOVTOWNED ENERGY TECHNOLOGY TARGET_HK RELATED CONSTANT Sum 
 
A) MAINLAND (Difference = 0.0130) 
     Means (Method A) 37.5 -16.9 -16.6 29.9 1.8 0.0 35.7 
     Coefficients (Method A) 73.2 113.0 19.6 -1.9 13.2 -152.8 64.3 
        
     Means (Method B) 0.7 -0.2 -11.3 31.9 0.3 0.0 21.4 
     Coefficients (Method B) 110.0 96.3 14.3 -3.8 14.7 -152.8 78.6 
        
B) HONG KONG (Difference = -0.0483) 
     Means (Method A) -37.5 -54.3 6.6 -29.2 121.0 0.0 6.6 
     Coefficients (Method A) -107.9 92.9 31.5 -31.3 -245.1 353.3 93.4 
        
     Means (Method B) -3.5 2.4 1.2 -5.0 -15.5 0.0 -20.4 
     Coefficients (Method B) -141.9 36.2 36.9 -55.5 -108.6 353.3 120.4 
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TABLE 9 (continued) 
Decomposition of the 1994-2001 / 2002-2008 ASCAR Gap 
 
 GOVTOWNED ENERGY TECHNOLOGY TARGET_HK RELATED CONSTANT Sum 
 
C) US (Difference = -0.0721)      
     Means (Method A) 18.0 0.0 -121.7 -104.4 102.9 0.0 -105.2 
     Coefficients (Method A) -13.3 5.8 -149.4 -51.8 -137.0 550.9 205.2 
        
     Means (Method B) 6.8 5.8 5.7 -11.1 -17.5 0.0 -10.3 
     Coefficients (Method B) -2.1 0.0 -276.8 -145.2 -16.5 550.9 110.3 
        
D) AGGREGATED (Difference = -0.0483) 
     Means (Method A) -6.6 44.3 -9.6 -72.5 41.5 0.0 -2.8 
     Coefficients (Method A) -41.9 -68.9 -45.2 -50.8 -79.6 389.2 102.8 
        
     Means (Method B) 0.6 4.7 0.5 -16.4 -1.5 0.0 -12.0 
     Coefficients (Method B) -49.2 -29.2 -55.3 -106.9 -36.6 389.2 112.0 
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FIGURE 1 
Acquiring Firm’s Demand and Supply of OMA Projects 
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FIGURE 2 
Histogram of CAR(-1,1) Values: 1994-2001 versus 2002-2008 
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FIGURE A.1 
Histogram of CAR(-1,-1) Values: 1994-2001 versus 2002-2008 (Mainland) 
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FIGURE A.2 
Histogram of CAR(-1,1) Values: 1994-2001 versus 2002-2008 (Hong Kong) 
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B.  2002-2008 
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FIGURE A.3 
Histogram of CAR(-1,1) Values: 1994-2001 versus 2002-2008 (U.S.) 
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B.  2002-2008 
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